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Climate change affects the entire globe. However, its effects are influenced by local 
geographic conditions and unevenly spread social adaptation capacities. Different levels of 
social vulnerability can be observed which are explained by distinct levels of wealth – so the 
general explanation goes. Such correlations cannot be neglected and are quite trivial: 
assuming similar geographical conditions, The Netherlands are better prepared to raise dikes 
against flooding than Bangladesh.  
But what about different coping capacities occurring despite of comparable levels of wealth? 
Why is it that the Mississippi delta was devastated by hurricane Katrina whereas the Rhine-
Meuse delta has remained almost unaffected up to now? What accounts for the fact that 
Texas, not really renowned for caring much for environmental niceties, has set up more 
windmills than California and is close to outpacing Denmark and Germany? How come that 
Texas nevertheless rejects any environmental political guidelines from Washington?  
Our analysis will shed some light on the question of how different approaches and coping 
capacities with regard to climate change can be explained. Our analysis will focus on the 
intricate interaction of ideology, institutions and technology (cf. figure 1). By taking these 
analytical pillars as vantage points for our analysis, we refer to arguments presented by 
Schwarz and Thompson (1990), Mamadouh (1999), and Dryzek (2008), who claim a 
correlation between cultural frames, socio-economic institutions and environmental politics. 
We will try to elaborate and systematize these arguments and apply them to strategies laid out 
to primarily cope with climate change.  
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Looking at specific coping measures and technologies like raising levees or installing wind 
turbines in Texas and The Netherlands, we will search for the underlying institutional 
structures which make specific technologies blossom or wither within a given societal 
environment. For this purpose, we take arguments from Cultural Theory on Risks (CTR) and 
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from New Institutional Economics (NIE) and synthesize them in a new framework. 
Admittedly, this combination is rather unconventional. However, we will show that these 
theoretical currents lend themselves for our research question. Although  neither the CTR nor 
the NIE approches have taken much notice of one another so far, they present many parallels 
which deserve elaboration. As will be shown further down, some of the main blind spots in 
both theoretical  currents can be softened by combining them to a coherent approach.  
The rationality behind this conjunction is that societies which are rather coined by collective 
principles like The Netherlands are better prepared to cope with cooperative tasks like district 
heating or building dikes whereas liberal institutions, which are predominant like, let us say in 
Texas, support and allow for individual coping strategies like wind turbines or air condition 
installation. Here, New Institutional Economics come into play in order to analyse the 
interrelations between technologies, their positive or negative externalities in their context 
with different types of institutions and organisations.  
Beyond the contrast of collectivism and individualism yet another difference seems to be 
central: whereas conventionalism relies on established conceptions, facts and coping 
strategies (like e.g. building dikes), innovativeness allows for speculation, conceiving novel 
risks and inventing new technologies. Thus we claim a good match of open-mindedness and 
the embracement of new risks and novel abatement technologies and of conventionalism with 
tight control and mastering of established technologies.  
Before going into detail, a short retrospect may help to understand the match or mismatch of 
ideologies and technologies. In the past, egalitarian social democratic attitudes and 
environmental protection were perceived as two contradictory agendas. The public perceived 
a conflict of objectives between economic growth and environmental protection, politicans 
often found themselves in the dilemma of either being able to finance social welfare or 
environmental measurements, and labour unions, too, played the card of jobs versus  
environmentalism.  
What can be observed in contrast to these conflicts of interests is a new perspective in which 
environmental and social democratic attitudes seem to go hand in hand, at least in Europe. In 
this respect, environmental protection and respective services and technologies are even seen 
as the novel driving forces of economic growth over the next decades. “Ecological 
modernisation” is the new charm to secure high rates of employment, social justice (even on a 
global scale) and environmental protection. In this context, Dryzek (2008) claims that nation 
states which are rather coined by egalitarian principles should be better prepared to cope with 
environmental challenges like droughts or flooding than their liberal counterparts. Looking at 
the progress of the latest negotiations on climate change in Copenhagen, these observations 
seem to be confirmed at a first glance. Following the public discourse, we could now happily 
join in singing the song of morally good Europe and bad North America – but we will refrain 
from doing so. The picture we will draw is much more complex and intricate. Taking 
externalities into account, we will highlight some cases in which liberal economies like the 
United States highly contribute to climate protection even without the explicit intention of 
doing so. Coincidentally - or should we say: by benevolent providence - the fossil energy 
reserves shrink and prices explode parallel to the acceleration of the greenhouse effect. 




After these preliminary thoughts, we will now present and explain first our modifications of 
the CTR and the cultural bias thesis (ch. 1) to then sketch out our argument about 
technological bias from the NIE perspective, first more generally (ch. 2) and then applied to 
coping with climate change (ch. 3). We will then apply the entire theory in the form of two 
case studies which compare coping strategies in The Netherlands and in the South of the 
United States - one about the protection of river deltas, the other on the erection of wind 
turbines (ch. 4). Finally (ch. 5) we will try to reformulate the theory again in a short and 
incisive way and will give a short outlook on political prospects.   
 
 
1. Cultural bias and Climate Change - a revision of the Cultural Theory on Risks  
The Cultural Theory on risks, as developed by Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky in their 
seminal book "Risk and Culture" (1982), is one of the path breaking works in environmental 
sociology. The main idea is that different milieus in modern societies develop different world 
views, and based on these world views different conceptions of risk. It is maintained that 
cognitive perceptions of societal dangers have the function to maintain and reinforce social 
order and social institutions. The respective milieu tends to associate harm - from sickness to 
famine to man-made disasters - with conduct that transgresses its societal norms: milieus 
imbue their members with aversions to subversive behavior and focus resentment on the 
deviators. Douglas sees the different milieus and their world views - i.e. their "cultural bias" - 
as constituted by two dimensions which she calls "group" and "grid". A “high group” way of 
life exhibits a high degree of social cohesion and is put in opposition to “low group” which 
gives room for individual liberty and self-sufficiency. A “high grid” way of life is 
characterized by strong cognitive conventions and formalisation, whereas “low grid” allows 
for new ideas, subjectivity and the ambiguities and uncertainties which emerge here.
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Michiel Schwarz and Michael Thompson also used the resulting typology to envision 
different conceptions of nature attributed to the respective milieus (figure 2).  
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 With this definition we follow Douglas 1974: 87. As has often been noticed, the connotations of "grid" may 
shift in the publications from CTR authors. 
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Figure 2  
 
The Cutural Theory on Risks met with quite a lot of positive resonance as well as critique 
(Boholm 1996). In our view, some major modifications must be made to allow working with  
this theory in a more plausible way and with higher compatibility to New Institutional 
Economics. Thus the theory may - hopefully - also be better corroborated empirically! The 
three major revisions are  as follows:  
- to take into account the fact of functional differentiation 
- to apply to the market the right classification 
- to redefine the concept of "nature". 
From her early academic training and throughout most of her life, Douglas worked as a social 
anthropologist with pre-modern communities. On this basis she developed her grid-group 
scheme as a device to typologise whole "cultures". Later on, and especially with the above 
mentioned work "Risk and Culture", she universalized the scheme, applying it also to modern, 
functionally differentiated societies, but - as far as we know – without discussing the fact that 
there is a strong analytical contrast between "mechanic" and "organic solidarity", to use Emile 
Durkheim‟s words. This may explain the rather undifferentiated conception that, in the 
rhetoric of Cultural Theory, individuals, social structures, milieus, institutions and whole 
societies are often conflated (Keller/Poferl 1998). But modern "organic" societies develop 
functionally differentiated spheres with the result that not the whole cognition and self-
conception of the individual but only the role script has to be supportive for the respective 
institutions. As a result of ongoing functional differentiation, modern individuals shift 
between roles throughout their days and throughout their lifetime, playing their roles only 
with semi-attention, called "practical consciousness" by Anthony Giddens. Only in the 
retrospect of biographical narrations, sociological interviews, and psychological laboratory 
experiments, the contradictions and ambivalence in and between everyday practices are 
smoothed and eradicated with the aim to construct a consistent "self" and a stringent "life 
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course" (Gill 2003: 107ff.). This may explain the fact that, with methodological individualism 
and standardised interviews, the empirical corroboration for the Cultural Theory is not very 
strong (Marris et al. 1998). It also may explain that the CTR explanations often sound 
implausible when applied to everyday experience. For example "environmentalism" is not just 
an invention of "egalitarian sects", as held by Douglas and Wildavsky, but a mainstream 
phenomenon in modern societies. In consequence we would propose to conceive the 
grid/group-typology mainly as a difference between functional spheres with their discourses 
and practices, and only secondarily as a cultural bias of individuals or national societies
2
. 
Implementing Jürgen Habermas‟ (1997) distinction between "System" und "Lebenswelt" 
within the grid dimension
3
, the "system" with its instrumental, anonymous and wide reaching 
coordination media "money" and "power" is embodied by the high grid fields of "market" and 
"bureaucracy" whereas the "lifeworld" corresponds to the "low grid" of less formalised, more 
personalised and more consensus-based communication in the modern family, education, 
science and the democratic public. Based on these deliberations, we suggest the following set 
of institutions:  
 
      high grid 
 
 
          
   market      public administration  
 
 
 low group         high group 
 
 
   private sphere     democratic and scientific 
         public spheres  
 
 
      low grid 
Figure 3  
 
- Public administration is based on strict formal rules as well as on strong collective 
solidarity - here we follow CTR. 
- Scientific and democratic arenas are based on the institutionalisation of what Jürgen 
Habermas calls the assumption of absence of power ("herrschaftsfreier Diskurs"). Open to 
deal with new phenomena, new challenges and new conflicts, they are "low grid". "High 
group" is necessary to keep on discussing, to come to consent, and to avoid schism. In this 
sense they may be paraphrased as "egalitarian" but in contrast to the anti-environmentalist 
polemic in "Risk and Culture", it becomes clear that this egalitarianism is neither marginal 
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 To avoid "cognitive dissonance" and to decide role conflicts, individuals may identify with a main role - their 
vocation or their family and gender role. Nations may - according to Varieties of Capitalism and Welfare 
Regime theories - specialise their production on the world market and therefore develop a cultural bias within 
their social institutions. But both are only possible to a certain extent. 
3
 But without Habermas' often criticised dichotomisation! 
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nor avoidable in modern societies. But based on the contradiction of "low grid" and "high 
group" it is clear that the instutionalisation of the sphere keeps being always a bit 
precarious. Thus, recourse to moral alarmism is quite common and understandable.  
- As to market, we made the decision to move it into another quadrant! We see it as a 
misconception of CTR to describe the market in modern societies as "low grid". This 
misconception may be taken from classical and neoclassical economic theories with their 
ideological or naive stance that markets would emerge spontaneously and "naturally" in all 
societies and in all historical times if only they were not artificially restricted (for critique 
see Polanyi 1971). But modern markets are only conceivable on the basis of property 
rights, contract law, standards and conventions to be enforced and guaranteed by the 
Leviathan (North 1988), and therefore clearly classify for "high grid". With the 
contradiction of "low group" and "high grid", the  market, too, is a precarious sphere which 
cannot be upheld on its own principles but is dependent on external support. This, in 
parallel, may explain frenetic liberal rhetorics - if the market was "natural", counterfactual 
rhetorics would not be necessary.  
- The private sphere is obviously "low group"; and "low grid" since it allows for subjectivity 
and cognitive idiosyncracies. In this sense, the private sphere only exists in modern 
individualistic societies where cognition, values and emotions are no longer governed by 
traditions (cf. Beck 1986). In contrast to the other three spheres, the private sphere may 
allow for temporary retreat from social exchange, but nevertheless it may be productive for 
the neighboring spheres, be it that individuals may develop new aims and arguments for 
scientific and public discourse, or be it that they actually develop really new products for 
the market. In the latter sense, entrepreneurs may qualify for "low grid" (as envisioned by 
conventional CTR), but only if we think of them as hackers in a garage - the young Bill 
Gates and the young Steve Jobs for example - and not as CEOs in big companies with 
meanwhile conventionalised products and strongly established organisations. 
These functional spheres co-construct risks in a process that we would call the "modern risk 
cycle": 
 
      high grid 
 
   new markets    public decisions 
   new insurances    public regulation  
   new technologies   public redistribution  
 
 low group         high group 
 
 
new side effects marginal science    more established sciences 
= new risk cycle + private paranoia   public protest and debate 
 





New risks are usually detected by marginal science and individual idiosyncrasies. To emerge 
out of the mist of private paranoia, NGOs have to be established and arguments have to be 
communicated to a wider public. Once campaigns prove to be successful, more established 
science - "normal science" in the sense of Thomas Kuhn (1967) – will test and eventually 
corroborate and objectify the arguments. On the basis of "higher grid", i.e. stronger and more 
formalised consent, public decisions may be taken, public regulations issued and new 
instruments for redistribution installed. Parallel to this and in expectation of the political 
outcome new markets arise for new abatement technologies and for new forms of private 
insurances. New industries will be developed with seemingly "pro-environmental" concerns 
and the political rhetoric of new occupation opportunities to be installed - called the 
emergence of "helper interests" by Volker von Prittwitz (1990). The risk of climate change is 
currently in the phase that the idea is now taken seriously by more established organisations 
and by more nation states. In consequence of the new technologies, new side effects may 




Against the concept by Schwarz and Thompson (see above, figure 2) it has to be clarified that 
only in the regions of "low grid" nature is conceptualised in the modern (romantic) sense as 
something opposed to society - i.e. the "wild" and "free" nature of nature conservationism. In 
the regions of "high grid", nobody directly speaks out for nature in that sense: market actors 
care only for their investments, state actors care for the social order – be it that they are 
disturbed by environmental protests or undermined by the consequences of physical change. 
The outcome may be the same as in the picture drawn by Schwarz and Thompson - with 
strong concerns for environmentalism in the public arena, some concern in the public 
administration and no concern in the market, and with the private sphere not articulated 
enough so that it may resemble "fatalism". But the rationale behind all this is a different one: 
the market and the state as functional spheres take into account only processes which follow 
their own logic, and as long as nature is "out there" and has not yet been "socialised", it is 
neither relevant for investments nor for societal stability (cf. Luhmann 1986, 1991).  
So far, we have described "grid" and "group" cultural bias as primarily inherent in institutions 
and organisational role scripts. Here we can expect the strongest effects from cultural bias 
since organisations specialise according to their functional goals - of course an oil drilling 
company and an environmentalist NGO see climate change in rather different ways. Only 
secondarily, as already mentioned, but nevertheless: also the self-concept and the externally 
attributed image of individuals may be classified according to this scheme, with persons being 
characterised rather as "collectivistic team players" or "individualistic competitors" in the 
group dimension, and rather as "conventionalist Babbitts" or "innovative Freaks" in the 
dimension of grid. But individuals have to balance out the biases of many different role 
scripts - this is one of the explanations why environmental attitudes (i.e. self concepts) are 
only of faint influence on everyday action, with the result that we can find only very few 
people who really act consequentially - in that they do not drive cars, do not fly to 
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 Historically we can observe that near and imminent risks are superseded by more global and more uncertain 
risks (Gill 1999). 
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conferences, do not eat meat and do not live in large suburban residences. Third, also nations 
or other political bodies may classify for cultural or ideological bias which in the group-
dimension are either more "individualistic", i.e. "liberal", or more collectivistic, i.e. 
"coordinated" or "social". The grid-dimension may then be translated  into conservative (high 
grid) versus progressive (low grid) in the sense that conservativism sticks strongly to existing 
conventions whereas progressivism tries to be more open towards new developments and to 
invest its energy to embrace social and technological innovations. The usual three or four 
traditions of modern political theory (Heidenreich 2002) may then be arranged in the 
following way - admittedly implying the contention that we see the market liberals‟ claim for 
"progressiveness" as misleading:  
 
      high grid 
 
 
   (Market-)Liberalism   Conservativism / 
        Authoritarian Socialism 
 
 low group         high group 
 
        
    Anarchism   Libertarian Socialism 
 
 
      low grid 
Figure 5 
 
The presently prominent comparative approaches of Varieties of Capitalism (Hall/Soskice 
2001), National Systems of Innovation (Malerba 2004), and Welfare Regimes Paths (Esping-
Andersen 1991) may be understood accordingly. 
 
 
2. Natural and technological coping necessities - grid/group from the perspective of New 
Institutional Economics  
Up to now, we have only asked what organisations, individuals and national societies "want" 
according to their worldviews and values, but not what the functional necessities are which 
may also determine coping reactions. What we try to develop now are parallels to be found in 
New Institutional Economics of functional determinations which rather easily fit in the 
group/grid typology (Mamadouh 1999). In the fifth section we try to explain why these 
parallels are perhaps not coincidental, but a consequence of co-evolution of attitudes and 
functions in different technological and economic environments. In short, our contention is 
that environmental behaviour is founded on institutions, and that these institutions in turn are 
based not only on cultural bias but also on physical necessities with which organisations and 
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national societies may be confronted.  
To illustrate our point we should start with Karl August Wittfogel‟s (1957: 109 ff., 204 ff.) 
famous account of "Oriental Despotism". The Orient was the first place for “hydraulic 
societies” to emerge, like in ancient China, with institutions closely linked to the development 
and control of agricultural systems of irrigation and flood control. Irrigation and flood control 
only work under highly coordinated conditions, giving rise to a centralized and 
knowledgeable bureaucracy. Whereas irrigation agriculture settles in fertile river valleys, 
pastoralists roam the more marginal semi-arid regions, forming only loose groups since, for 
ecological reasons, they have to disperse their herds more or less over the land. On this 
contrast Wittfogel establishes his law of changing returns of government action, with, on the 
one side increasing returns where the conditions for hydraulic settlements are given: here 
intense administrative controls of the irrigation system, the population and work force 
numbers, the crops used, and the amount and frequency of water flow induce high material 
wealth and strong military power. This is obviously the situation of high grid - with strong 
conventions, strong and coherent controls, large investments into objectivist science and 
technology,  with intense manipulation of nature - and high group - with strong coherence and 
dependency (cf. North 1988: 23 ff.). Diminishing returns to administrative effort on the other 
side are due to nomadic situations where the taxable value in balance for the costs of control 
in a wide territory is not great enough, and where control of key points and routes, with 
occasional punitive expeditions, is more effective than complete integration and 
subordination. And again, put in words of the Cultural Theory, with instable and epheremal 
communities, this is a situation of low group; and in consequence of the loose and extensive 
use and mostly passive control of the natural and social environment it has to be classified as 
low grid. 
Building on this, we could now go through a range of theories mainly from New Institutional 
Economics to show parallels, namely to  
- Transaction Cost Theory (North, Williamson) 
- Public Good Theory (Samuelson, Coase) 
- Diminishing vs. Increasing Returns to Scale and Scope 
- Negative Externalities (Pigou, Coase) 
But to cut a long story short, we rather directly present our synthesis from these theories in 
form of a group/grid property and contract theory. In the group dimension we would pose the 
contrast between dispersed versus connected production, consumption and environmental risk 
control (the latter is skipped here since we go into that below, ch. 3, in more detail). Low 
group is functional and more efficient, where the means of production are divisible and where 
consumption is rival, whereas high group applies to the opposite. Herds in the former example 
are divisible whereas flood control and irrigation downstream are dependent on enough flood 
control and adequate irrigation upstream. Consumption is more or less rival where goods and 
services are produced with proportional or increasing effort per quantity, or in other words, 
where the production - including household production - is governed by the mechanism of 
diminishing returns. This is the case, e.g. when the herd gives only enough milk to feed a 
small clan and when more goats would destroy the grazing land. And it is non-rival in those 
circumstances where strong economies of scale are given and the average per quantum 
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production effort decreases with more quantities consumed
5
. The effort to build and maintain 
the irrigation system is high, irrespective of whether the system is used to produce a small or a 
large amount of rice. That given, the average effort for a quantity of rice decreases. The 
mechanism of increasing returns generally applies to industrial - in contrast to craftmenship - 
production, and particularly to knowledge and information goods where the production effort 
for an additional copy is close to zero. Under the condition of non-rivalry it is efficient to 
enlarge the groups of consumers. Or, to put it in the perspective of Varieties of Capitalism 
approach: under the conditions of closely connected production systems with increasing 
returns it may prove economically favorable to have cooperative rules for industrial relations 
and a social welfare system to increase the demand for industrially produced goods even if 
this may give room for some laziness which may be avoided under a stricter and more 
comprehensive application of the market rule with its disciplining effect of the "hunger whip".  
In the grid dimension we would contrast effective and loose control of production, 
distribution and environmental risk (the latter is elaborated, again not here, but in ch. 3). 
Strong control in production means firmly established property rights as well as complete and 
easily enforceable contracts. In market exchange, strong grid means not only excludability, 
but also clear ex ante transparency of quantity, quality and price. This does not necessarily 
constitute a contrast between strong control by private property rights and loose control of 
collective commons, as liberal economists and philosphers have insinuated (Hardin 1968, 
Olson 1965, for a critique see Ostrom 1999). On the contrary, we would argue that effective 
property rights and contract controls in competitive (i.e. individualist) market settings are 
always derivated from collective power since for the legitimation, the internalisation and the 
enforcement of rules and laws there exist strong economies of scale
6
 - whereas more or less 
isolated and decentralised attempts of production and exchange, as imagined in Wild West 
movies and given in premodern history or non-developing countries, usually result in a wide 
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 The more usual textbook examples of rivalry and non-rivalry in consumption, e.g. bread versus light-houses 
(Coase 1974), in our view are only a special and more dichotomous case of this more general and more 
gradual formula.  
6
 At least up to a certain extent which is given with the "imperial overstrech" (cf. Kennedy 1987)  
7
 But of course, Mancur Olson is right and Elinor Ostrom would consent that group control is only possible on 
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    i.e. loose control of property rights and contracts     
      low grid 
Figure 6 
 
To fully understand the high grid position of the modern market, one has to contrast it to the 
bazar (Geertz 1978) and the other exchange relations in premodern cultures (cf. figure 6). 
"Barter", which Adam Smith as the founding father of the liberals stylised as "natural", in the 
premodern context means a wildly mixed set of exchange relationships which ranges from 
gifts to establish clientele binding to tedious information search and long haggling, since 
quantities, qualities and prices are neither available nor comparable on the spot and prone to 
discrimination and treachery (Geertz 1978). Whereas agricultural goods are distributed on the 
basis of reciprocity and power relations, long distance trade involves the robbery of caravans, 
protection money extortion and warlordism (Polanyi 2001, Sahlins 1971, North 1991). Only 
in modern settings property rights and exchange standards - e.g. ex ante visibility of the price, 
administrative calibrating of weights, reliable quality labels - can be taken for granted. And as 
the New Economic Sociology shows, even there they are only guaranteed to a certain extent, 
especially if we look to quality goods, professional services, labor contracts, and financial 
markets (e.g. Podolny 1993).  
Thus the governance kernel of functionally differentiated societies is bureaucracy, modernized 
and depersonalized by formal rule binding, written transactions and bookkeeping, recruiting 
on the basis of expert knowledge, separation from private households, and with only little 
difference between public state and private company administration (Weber 1968). With 
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 "Happy" are well governed as opposed to "tragic" commons, where the "tragedy of the commons" (Hardin 
1968) really applies - the distinction (not in this wording) was established by Ostrom and colleagues, and a 
rather complex model of empirical indicators was given there to predict the happy or tragic outcome (Poteete 
et al. 2010). In our framework we would propose that with increasing return to scale, i.e. with the tendency to 
non-rivalry, exclusion becomes profitable, all the more so if exclusion costs, too, tend to be diminishing with 
the scale of the common pool resource concerned.  
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industrialisation, companies have become ever larger and states ever stronger through the 
development of economies of scale and scope in military control, administration and 
industrial production. The increasing return to collective efforts may be explained by 
transaction cost theory, i.e. on the one side by the asset specificity and indivisibility of many 
technologies, and on the other side by the fact that reliable long term relationships support 
mutual trust and intrinsic engagement as a functional equivalent to transparency and formal 
contract control in technological and organisational contexts where no ex ante and sometimes 
even no ex post measurements are really available (Williamson 1981). Therefore the large 
bureaucracies of company and state administration "reside" in the high grid/high group field.  
But hierarchic control has to be less tight in situations where new knowledge, intrinsic 
motivations and self-determiniation are required, i.e. particularly in innovative organisational 
fields and in volatile environments (Burns/Stalker 1994, Osterloh/Frey 2000). And since 
modern democratic societies are based on the idea and practice of institutionalised scepticism, 
critique, and innovation, they create generalized volatility with the consequence that modern 
school curricula are trying to implant self-determination, curiosity, and creativity which is 
only possible in non-repressive social environments (Sargent 2006, Parsons/White 1968), i.e. 
under the somewhat paradox conditions of high group and low grid. But with increasing 
returns to scale and general wealth, scarcity is no more an obsession with the consequence 
that low grid not necessarily ends in opportunism and piracy but may also allow for voluntary 
engagement and group association. Whether or not goods which tend to non-rivalry are then 
distributed on the basis of market prices, administrative fees, or for free as in the case of open 
access, sometimes depends on exclusion possibilities and costs, but often is rather a question 
of cultural bias and loud debate, all the more so since functional necessities are less obvious.  
 
 
3. Risk exposure, mitigation and adaptation strategies from a functional grid/group 
perspective 
As already mentioned in the preceding chapter, also risks can be analysed from the 
perspective of whether they are dispersed or connected and whether we can observe 
economies or diseconomies of scale in the coping strategies - this would give rise to the 
distinction between low or high group. In the grid dimension we can distinguish between 
calculable and well understood risks with well focused coping strategies on the one side, and 
barely understood risks with more diffuse reactions on the other side of the scale.  
 
a) different risk expositions 
First we shall have a look at the geo-physical "nature" of the threat, i.e. at risk exposition. We  
can see on the one side dispersed and isolated negative events which may hit the individual on 
a coincidental and individual basis - thunderbolts, car accidents, heart-attacks may serve as 
examples. On the other side of the group scale we see hazards that hit the whole community 
as connected events, such as floods, epidemics and thunderstorms. But perhaps the inquiry 
into the "nature of the risk" is too diffuse and we should instead ask how "guilt" is usually 
attributed. On the low group side we see self incurred risks (including damage to be attributed 
13 
 
to weak prevention efforts), and we put on the high group side  risks which are conceived as a 
consequence of political decisions (or their absence). Coincidental risks are somewhere in 
between - nobody is guilty, but nevertheless everybody hit may expect some empathy and 
solidarity.  
 
      high grid 
 
 
  happens to the individual or   happens to the national or 
  small communities: isolated   global society: connected events 
  events (car accident)    (flood, epidemic, climate change) 
 
 low group         high group 
 
        




      low grid 
Figure 7 
 
Nowadays, the above mentioned examples of risks are rather well understood and also 
calculable to a certain extent - which would qualify them for “high grid” and which makes 
them insurable, at least concerning their individual consequences and if "moral hazard" can be 
excluded (Ewald 1993, Bonß 1995, Beck 1986). On the other end of the grid scale we 
speculate about future events which may or may not occur like e.g. negative side effects of the 
use of cell phones. Or we can observe trends such as the increasing occurrence of allergies 
which optionally may be attributed to too much or too little dirt, to too many or too few 
chemicals; perhaps we should better say that we do not know for sure yet. In the case of 
relative ignorance we would often have difficulties in attributing the group dimension: if the 
number of brain tumours was to increase with the frequent use of cell phones these would be 
more or less self-incurred and more or less dispersed damages among coincidentally 
vulnerable individuals. If the number of tumours was to increase around transmitter stations it 
would better qualify as a group event. Quite understandably, low grid risks are publicly 
debated over a long time and with shifting results since institutional responses have not yet 
been established (cf. Evers/Nowotny 1987). That should not mean that high grid risks would 
never be debated, but here the question of whether they should be attributed rather to the 
individual or rather to the collective side is usually quickly closed by a routine decision.  
Connected with the question of guilt is the demand for responsibilities with respect to 
prevention and reaction. But this brings us back to "nature", i.e. the characteristics of 
technologies as sketched out in the previous chapter (ch. 2). Thus the question of 
responsibilities is a bit ambivalent, since it asks not only who is obliged to, but also who is 
rare or future events or causation not yet understood 
(effects of mobile phones, increasing allergies) 
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able to do something. Here we may meet with sibylline complexities since able actors will 
propagate their risk definitions which - just by coincidence? – will fit in their technological 
and organisational abilities. Or, to put it shorter: the crisis is the chance for competing helpers. 
 
b) proactive technologies (mitigating climate change)  
As we apply this consideration in the context of climate change, now, we can see that guilt is 
seldom debated in high grid official arenas, at least not by the guilty, i.e. by the early 
industrialised nations in Europe and North America. Instead, what we can observe is some 
enthusiasm when propagated technologies fit into the established institutional structures. 
Hence we see many wind turbines decentrally installed in Texas, flourishing on federal 
subsidies and regulations for regenerative energy (cf. “Renewable Portfolio Standard” (RPS)9) 
which make them rather profitable (Langniss/Wiser 2003, Wiser/Barbose 2008, Menz/Vachon 
2006). Interestingly enough, climate change is seldom mentioned as a motive for the 
subsidies, but  striving for independence of Arab oil (which is thought to fuel terrorism) and 
the shrinking oil supplies in general. More or less by coincidence, the shrinking fossil energy 
reserves and expectations of rising prices give decentral incentives for preventive action, even 
if the high group actors fail to concert coordination and redistribution on a global scale as 
observed from Kyoto to Copenhagen (Ostrom 2009). But of course, on national or local 
levels, many possibilities for high group action are given, be it in the realm of regulation and 
subsidies, or be it in the realm of infrastructure which, for technical reasons, may be more 
effectively managed in monopolistic than in competitive ways (whether the monopoly is 
called public or private does not make the difference here!).  
 
      high grid 
 
  wind turbines     cogeneration of heat and power 
  self interest     climate treaties / redistribution
   
 
 
 low group         high group 
 
 
  new exotic technologies   experimenting with 
  (wind turbines 30 years ago)   dematerialised life styles 
 
      low grid 
Figure 8 
 
                                                 
9
 The RPS can be described as a market-driven regulation policy that requires an increasing production of 
renewable energy. It binds electricity suppliers to provide a specific proportion of electricity from renewable 
resources like wind, solar or biomass.  
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Since climate change is an established concern nowadays, it no more ranges in the realms of 
high grid, but in the backyards of low grid. There, new exotic technologies may flourish , 
such as wind turbines did thirty years ago when they had been propagated and installed in 
hippie camps of the so-called "alternative" subculture. And out there also looms the still 
unresolved but pressing question of how we can voluntarily dematerialise our life styles since 
the planet could never carry an estimated 12 billion people with their westernized hunger for 
material resources (Schauer 2002).  
 
c) reactive strategies (adapting to climate change) 
But as we all know, climate change already happens - when writing this article in August 
2010, we hear all the while the news of the centenary floods in Pakistan and the heat in 
Russia. So prevention is no more possible and beyond mitigation we have to adapt to climate 
change. The market individualists again would propagate self-help with decentralized and 
well established technologies, e.g. air condition, whereas the public administration would be 
needed for collective and repressive measures such as building dikes, the redistribution of 
resources to more vulnerable parts of society or the evacuation of people. What collectivist 
low grid reactions are to be expected? Perhaps not so much protest because the story is now 
objectified as mainstream and therefore no more thrilling. And the actual catastrophe is 
always the hour of emergency rule and the staging of repressive leaders (cf. Carl Schmitt 
1921). But we can subsume some other reactions here which can be observed in this respect. 
Whereas flood regulation after the Second World War was based on forcing rivers into ever 
higher and narrower dikes to win and protect as much land and real estate as possible, we can 
observe a renaturation of water flows during the last twenty years. That is so because 
engineers have learned that high and narrow dikes upstream precipitate stronger and faster 
deluges downstream. This means that the direct and nearby control of river banks was reduced 
in favor of increasing the indirect but more overall control of the whole river system - what at 
first sight might seem as lower grid, at second sight means more coordination between the 
downstream and upstream regions, i.e. tighter regulation. A better fitting example may be the 
immediately and more or less spontaneously organised help measures when floods occur, like 
stacking up sand bags, or help for the weaker members of the community. Regardless of 
whether low or high grid – once group measures fail, people individually resort to low group 
and low grid reactions: unorganised escape, the rich in their cars, the poor on foot, others 
plundering, and again others klinging to the roofs of their houses, singing prayers and 
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4. Some case studies for illustration 
What we are going to do in this chapter is to pick up the main building blocks of our 
argumentation in order to test its narrative plausibility. Taking grid and group as the central 
dimensions, we will mainly focus on the historical and current state of building and 
maintaining dikes in The Netherlands and on the rather new phenomenon of regenerative 
wind power in Texas. By taking dikes and wind turbines as examples, we account for two 
crucial considerations: first, for the differentiation between connected and unconnected risks, 
technologies and their respective institutions; second, for the entanglement between the 
selected risks, technologies and respective institutions on the one hand and the predominant 
cultural bias on the other. In this context and with regard to the work of Esping-Andersen 
(1991), we distinguish between a liberal cultural bias in the case of Texas and a social-
democratic one in the case of The Netherlands. Whereas Dryzek (2008) claims that nation 
states which are coined by social and egalitarian principles should be better prepared to cope 
with environmental challenges like droughts or flooding than their liberal counterparts, we 
will show that this may be a premature assumption. Under the influence of the particular 
cultural bias, specific institutions and technologies matured and specialised on coping with the 
respective "favourite risk". Taking positive externalities into account, the claimed advantage 
of the egalitarian bias cannot be taken for granted.  
 
a) grid/group dimensions of flood protection in New Orleans and The Netherlands 
The geo-physical preconditions of life social actors are confronted with in low lying areas like 
deltas greatly differ from those in other regions, e.g. the Alps. Instead of reckoning on 
avalanches, costal residents have to reckon on the potential risks of storms and flooding. With 
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regard to climate change and sea-level rise, the IPCC refers to low lying areas as hotspots of 
social vulnerability (IPCC 2007). According to our previous considerations, floods can be 
categorized as connected risk. Now, one could be misled (by one‟s own cultural bias) to claim 
that the inevitable answer to connected risks is a connected technology like dikes (and 
therefore high group, too). However, by comparing different approaches to potential storms 
and floods in New Orleans and The Netherlands
10
, one is able to observe how the cultural bias 
shapes the way in which the risk of flooding is selected and addressed (cf. Schubert 2009).  
In the case of New Orleans and hurricane Katrina in 2005, the liberal bias leads to a situation 
in which the connected risk of flooding is handled in a constellation characterized by low 
group and iridescent degrees of grid. In other words, the connected risk of flooding is more or 
less dealt with individually with the market as the main institution for coordination. Of 
course, New Orleans is protected by dikes, but it cannot be denied that little emphasis was put 
on precautionary steps like in a situation of high grid and group like in The Netherlands 
(Dyson 2006, Bergal et al. 2007, Hudson et al. 2008). Totally in line with the liberal bias of 
market efficiency, individual residents lobbied for better flood protection in order to increase 
the value of their real estate and whole communities asked for federal subsidies to enhance 
dikes first and foremost to get more space for housing in order to profit from increasing taxes 
thanks to more residents (Colten 2006, Colten 2009). But for the same reason - liberal 
resistance against government intervention - the corresponding actions were weak and 
uncoordinated. 
According to the most central institution – the market – respective ideologies and coping 
technologies can be observed. Due to a low degree of de-commodification and a rather weak 
welfare state and the predominant myth of market efficiency, coping technologies go hand in 
hand with individual wealth and are accompanied by a world view characterized by strong 
“bootstrap-individualism” and “the self-made man” which are typical of low group. Whereas 
the rich and mostly white population can afford to build houses on stilts or artificially 
heightened grounds, have insurances and possess cars in order to escape from storms like 
Katrina, the poor residents (mostly black) do not have access to these coping technologies. 
Due to the fact that they are not able to capitalize on the institution of the market, they are left 
behind and have to hark back on coping strategies within their individual range, e.g. looting 
and saying prayers, i.e. low grid. Summing up and with regard to the range of government 
action, it can be argued that the situation in New Orleans is principally coined by low group 
whereas observable variations in coping technologies have to be explained by different levels 
of grid: the rich are able to make use of the high grid situation of the market, the poor find 
themselves in rather anarchic situations of low grid. In this context, the strong religious and 
charity movements can be discussed as a partial equivalent for modern grid and group 
institutions (market and bureaucracy). They induce some norms and some solidarity, but only 
in a particularistic community, not on a national scale.  
In contrast to New Orleans, the connected risk of flooding is dealt with in a systematically 
                                                 
10
 Admittedly, it could be argued that there is some kind of spatial incompatibility between The Netherlands and 
New Orleans, e.g. in comparing a whole country to a poor and mid-size city in a poor state. However, we 
believe that this comparison is well suited to describe the particular institutional and structural differences 
between the liberal and the social-democratic cultural bias with regard to flood protection.  
18 
 
organised and connected way in The Netherlands. Here, we can observe that coping 
technologies for water regulation and the respective institutions historically co-evolved and 
shaped the constitution of The Netherlands. The emergence of the Dutch “water board”11 can 
be interpreted as a first democratic institution that addresses the problems of coordination and 
collective action which are associated with the provision and maintenance of public goods 
like dikes (Lazaroms/Poos 2004, van de Ven 2004). From a historic perspective and according 
to van de Ven (2004: 39 et seq., 112 et seq.), the beginnings of flood protection were coined 
by low group and grid (unlike today)
12
. Until the first emergence of water boards during the 
13
th
 century (Lazaroms/Poos 2004), flood protection had been accomplished individually (low 
group) and followed the principle of trial and error. As time went on, coping technologies in 
the form of dikes, polders or flood gates became more and more intricate, complex, and 
expansive. The continuous individual measures resulted in problems of coordination, 
conflicting interests and negative externalities. In other words, the technology and its 
externalities became more and more connected (high group) and well-engineered (high grid).  
At present it can only be speculated where the egalitarian, social-democratic bias of the 
Netherlands originates from which stands in contrast to the "Oriental Despotism" as described 
by Wittfogel. Was the inducement of participatory rights necessary for better acceptance and 
for decentral regulation and maintenance of the dikes themselves? Or was it due to the fact 
that the economic development of the Netherlands was based on strong movements of trader 
capitalism and therefore is the result of a balance between liberal and coordinated institutions? 
After the flood of 1953 had cost 1853 casualties, The Netherlands pursued a strategy of “zero 
tolerance” with regard to potential floods – absolute control of nature (and strong belief in its 
practicability) was the declared goal. Dikes were reconstructed and strengthened and with it 
the famous “Delta Works” assumed their present shape. However, these efforts were 
accompanied by negative externalities, such as shrinking retention space and confined view 
from the houses behind the dikes. Despite these efforts (or because of the negative 
externalities), The Netherlands only narrowly escaped severe flooding during the 1990ies and 
it became apparent that absolute control of nature was not a feasible goal. In consequence, a 
new type of water management – “Room for the River” – was developed and put into 
practice. Large pieces of land are designated as retention polders and further on only used for 
grazing or cropping, but not for settlement. With regard to social relationships, the new 
situation can be described by increasing degrees of grid and group: national and transnational 
residents have to negotiate about new spaces for flood retention and individuals have to be 
resettled or even disappropriated (Roth/Winnubst 2009, Kropp 2002). With regard to the 
natural environment, the dimension of grid is more ambivalent - control over land is sacrificed 
for the sake of more control over water.   
                                                 
11
 According to van de Ven, the emergence of the water-boards can be described as a process of centralisation. 
The management of flood protection devices “(…) was transferred from the self-governing village 
communities to the regional water boards” (van de Ven 2004: 114) and thus lifted onto a higher 
administrative level resulting in higher grid.  
12
 It has to be mentioned that van de Ven draws a rather sophisticated picture of water management between 
800 and 1250 AD. Dependent on local particularities (e.g. communities of free or un-free peasants and 
respective forms of community organization like mutual agreement or coercion), the situation was 
characterized by varying combinations of grid and group.  
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In sum we can observe a good match of flood protection technologies and the social-
democratic bias of the Netherlands and in contrast a mismatch for Louisiana, with the liberal 
bias there allowing only for regressive reactions, but not for reliable flood protection or 
systematically organised large scale rescue operations.  
 
b) grid/group dimensions of wind turbines in Texas 
In contrast to dikes, wind turbines represent an unconnected technology, at least in the Texan 
context. Against the background of the liberal bias, wind turbines are installed to tackle the 
(favourite) risks of rising energy prices, increasing dependency on foreign energy supplies 
and the fear of terrorist attacks (U.S. Department of Energy 2010).  
In the past, wind turbines were an individual and unconnected technological device to settle 
and cultivate the new frontier. Due to the width of the land and because early settlers (mostly 
farmers) were allowed to possess as much land as they were able to individually cultivate, 
decentralized settlement structures (and energy supply) evolved. In consequence, it can be 
argued that decreasing returns on government action are an inevitable consequence. Although 
it cannot be denied that there was strong solidarity between neighboring farmers, the general 
situation was coined by low grid and group. Leaving their highly structured and 
institutionalized home countries behind (in oppressive feudalistic Europe), settlers were eager 
to avoid any form of institutionalization except strong property rights and individual liberty, 
which resulted in the current situation of high liberal grid. 
In this context, the religious community of the Mormons presents an interesting exception. 
Whereas low grid and group farmers were not able to cultivate the arid fields in Utah and 
neighboring states, the Mormons managed to provide and maintain irrigation systems and to 
settle in these inhospitable areas. Here, it can be argued that the properties of the religious 
community are coined by high grid and high group which are crucial preconditions for 
collective action. Instead of individually trying to cultivate dry fields or to emigrate, the 
Mormon community was able to hark back on solidarity and conventions that enabled the 
successful and efficient cooperation and hence the provision of irrigation systems (cf. 
Wittfogel 1957: 36, Arrington/May 1975).  
Today, and due to the fact that wind farms are coordinated via market mechanisms, they 
present a coping technology which is coined by high liberal grid as defined above (cf. RPS, 
Langniss/Wiser 2003, Wiser/Barbose 2008, Menz/Vachon 2006). With regard to the 
dimension of group, it can be argued that the erection of wind turbines and the sheer 
production of electricity take place in a rather unconnected way in Texas. According to their 
liberal bias, the exploitation of wind (instead of oil) is just another way of making money and 
of securing their liberal way of life. Texans claim that, even from an aesthetic point of view, 
wind parks even look better than drilling rigs and pumping stations (Krauss 2008, Galbraight 
2009). It is the other way round in European states like Germany. In densely populated areas, 
erecting wind parks is a highly disputed project. Similarly to dikes, investors have to brace 
themselves for long negotiations between different stakeholders like environmentalists, 
residents and communities. In addition, strong European group regulations, i.e. admission 
procedures, present another stumbling block to effectively installing wind parks or even single 
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wind turbines and hence to the reduction of carbon dioxide.  
Here, it is important to have in mind that the sheer technology – wind turbines – is 
unconnected. It only becomes connected because of positive or negative externalities that go 
hand in hand with the technology and federal subsidies. In liberal societal environments like 
in Texas, which have a strong reputation for not caring much about environmental niceties, 
negative externalities are more or less neglected. Who cares about a handful of birds, which 
may be chopped up by the rotors, or some disoriented whales? Taking positive externalities 
into account, the Texan example appears in a different light. Although Texas rejects any 
environmental political guidelines from Washington, and although environmental protection 
and mitigating climate change has never been a “first priority project” on their agenda, Texas 
is about to become one of the world leaders with regard to regenerative energies.  
Summing up, it can be argued that the liberal bias selects and copes with risks that can be 
approached with unconnected coping technologies and via the market institutions whereas in 





What we have tried to sketch out here is an approach that builds a synthesis between the 
social constructivism of Cultural Theory and the technological functionalism of New 
Institutional Economics. The social constructivism of Cultural Theory claims that actors forge 
their institutions corresponding to their value and belief systems and conceive the stimuli and 
challenges from the social and natural environment and the reactions and coping strategies 
accordingly. Markets for example are built on liberal values and market actors conceive the 
world as a universe of disconnected chances and risks to win or lose money with their 
investments. Climate change is seen as nobody's guilt but rather as a turbulence in the 
environmental conditions of business. Coping means to write off some older investments and 
to swing to new waves and possibilities in the right moment
13
. Therefore an ideal type liberal 
would spit on the Kyoto and Copenhagen protocols and dismiss them as communist 
conspiracies of bureaucrats and intellectuals to enlarge their power and to strengthen their 
paranoid control regimes. For textbook liberals collective conceptions and reactions are 
conceivable only in one exemption: if property rights as the very precondition of markets are 
at stake - in this case nervous police and military reaction is the rule, as the "war on terror" 
has most recently shown.  
Technological and ecological determinism of New Institutional Economics on the other hand 
contends that physical properties of technologies and their contexts necessitate specific 
institutional and organisational settings to work efficiently. Of course everybody may fence a 
dike around her own house and land, but obviously it is more efficient and brings increasing 
returns to scale if the dikes are built around a larger settlement. In consequence, the 
individuals in the settlement without individual dikes around their houses live more intimately 
together and need stronger social cohesion to uphold the common responsibility for the public 
                                                 
13
 cf. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/T._Boone_Pickens  
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dike out there. Hence collectivist institutions have to be established and when the collective 
grows above a certain level hierarchies become necessary to contain opportunism and to 
uphold coordination. Based on collectivist traditions and institutions the conception and 
reaction to climate change typically differ from the liberal one: climate change is perceived as 
a result of human guilt and responsibility, with the consequence that redistribution and 
concerted prevention activities are envisioned.  
 
cultural          institutions               technological 
bias           organisations                   bias 
  value            institutional & 
  preferences          organisational fit 
 
grid/group dimension                 grid/group dimension 
of subjects            coping                     of objects 
             strategies   
Figure 10 
 
Up to this point we have an antithesis to cultural determinism and technological determinism 
standing in opposition. But what about the announced synthesis? To a certain extent 
geographical and environmental peculiarities may have been influential on the path selection 
during the foundation phases of the existing nation states and institutional settings. Yet, wars 
and class coalitions may have had a stronger impact (cf. Knöbl 1993). But that has long been 
over and since that phase, what we can observe, is rather strong path dependence and inertia 
in the institutional settings of nation states (Esping-Andersen 1991, Pierson 2004, Hall 2007). 
For established institutional settings and in the short run we would contend an institutional 
inertia over environmental and technological challenges: institutions first select and shape 
those risks which they are fit to cope with; secondly they select and shape the technological 
and organisational responses accordingly. This is even true of medium terms even if the above 
described risk conflicts may induce new regulations to be issued and new technologies to be 
developed. Only in the long run, external events such as economic crises may break the 
institutional inertia and with it the existing cultural bias, giving rise to more systemic 
adaptations. The Great Depression for example challenged the liberal bias of the United 
States, opening the way for the New Deal, i.e. a more coordinated and collectivist mode of 
institutional settings. In consequence of the economic crisis of the 1970ies the United States 
switched back to a neoliberal agenda (Fourcade-Gorinchas/Babb 2002). We have no such 
historical examples of environmental events up to now. But with stronger impacts on 
economic operations and everyday life, in the future major environmentally induced 
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